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The delusion of Unconsciousness: 






In Delusions of consciousness, Blackmore supports illusionism on 
consciousness, using a Humean approach toward "self." First, she tries to 
explain away the intuitive, realistic viewpoint on self-consciousness; she 
"explains why some the illusionary self-consciousness is so compelling" by 
claiming a "simple mistake in introspections" and tries to explain it away. 
Secondly, she concludes that the idea of illusionary self-consciousness 
shows the delusion of consciousness per se.  
 
In this paper, first, I shall show that her explanation against realism on 
consciousness (in support of the illusion of self-consciousness) is not 
decisive; it can be formulated such that works against illusionism. Secondly, 
I show that un-consciousness is a delusion and explain it away, not in a 
Humean approach, but in terms of the semantics of "forgetfulness." Thirdly, 
I shall show that Blackmore wrongly concludes delusion of consciousness, 
on the basis of illusionary self-consciousness, while the latter doesn't 
necessarily entail the former. 
 
  
1.1. Blackmore Humean explanation for illusionary self-consciousness 
 
Blackmore supports illusionism on consciousness. She, explicitly and 
implicitly, mentions it in different parts of her paper. She says: 
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"I refer to consciousness as illusory ...." 
 
And still in another spot, 
 
 
"Frankish asks why the illusion of phenomenality is so powerful. I 
would ask the related, but different, question of why this deluded 
theorizing is so tempting and so powerful. ..." 
 
Therefore, she believes in illusionism; however, here, she aims at the 
delusion of consciousness. She confesses that the existence of 
consciousness is strongly intuitive; however, she says that our intuition is 
wrong about that. Using the concept of introspection, she tries to explain 
away our intuition on the existence of consciousness and claims that self-
consciousness is an illusion. Her explanation is as follows: "One reason is 
a simple mistake in introspection. Asking [1-] 'Am I conscious now?' or [2-
] 'What is consciousness?' makes us briefly conscious in a new way. The 
delusion is to conclude that consciousness is always like this instead of 
asking, [3-] 'What is it like when I am not asking what is it like?" 
(Blackmore 2016) 
 
In response, she says:[ There is] 
 
"No clear distinction between conscious and unconscious ones. 
Consciousness is an attribution we make, not a property of only 
some special events or processes. Notions of the stream, contents, 
continuity, and function of consciousness are all misguided."  
and  
"We assume continuity and unity, which is simply not true. The 
illusion is powerful because it is so hard to answer a different 
question – what is it like the rest of the time? What is it like when I 
am not asking what is it like?" (Blackmore 2016) 
 
According to Blackmore, whenever we are asked about consciousness or 
some relevant questions, we think introspectively and we remember some 
memories and experiences; then a temporal and fabricated unity comes up, 
which is constructed of our thoughts, impressions, perceptions, etc. This 
unity is "momentary and misleading," and we feel that this unity represents 
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a continuous self, who is always conscious. However, we know that, at 
least on some occasions, e.g., when we are not asked by "what is it like?" 
there is no clear response to "what is it like then?"   
  
She called our attention to these occasions, which seem pretty 
"unconscious" state of our mind/self; and accordingly, claims that these 
occasions are real counterexamples for the "illusionary" idea of self-
consciousness. Then, she prefers to believe that the true state of affairs at 
work is exactly the very "unconscious" occasions, and the so-called 
"conscious"   occasions are just illusions.  
  
Blackmore believes that she could explain away our "intuitive self" idea, 
which is based on our introspection, using a new second-order 
introspective speculation on our responses to some questions like 3. She 
says:  
  
"There is thus something very curious about the nature of 
consciousness – that looking into consciousness reveals only what 
it is like when we are looking into it – and most of the time, we are 
not. So introspecting on our own minds is thwarted by the very fact 
of introspecting." (Blackmore 2016)  
  
That is, here we have two levels of introspection as follows:  
  
First-order introspection: in which we figure out what it is like to be 
conscious. This order would be clear in response to questions like [1-] 'Am 
I conscious now?' or [2-] 'What is consciousness?'  
  
Second-order introspection: in which we introspect on our introspection 
about consciousness and it reveals that most of the time, we are not 
conscious. This order would be clear when we think on some questions 
like [3-] 'What is it like when I am not asking what is it like?"  
  
She says that the result of our first order introspection would be thwarted 





1.2.Darkness example  
  
Blackmore makes her explanation still more clear by the "darkness" 
example. She states that:   
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"Can feel like turning on a light, but is that light always on? And if 
not, then what is the darkness like? Can we take a different tack 
and look into the darkness personally, by training our introspection 
to look more carefully?" (Blackmore 2016)  
  
She holds that it is a difficult question, and it is not easy to do that; 
however, she believes that we can find a solution through mediation. She 
also states:  
  
 "Every time I 'turn on the light' by asking myself what my 
consciousness is like, it seems to be a flowing stream of 
everchanging, unified contents, much as it was last time I looked. 
That's fine. That's how it seems, and how it seems is what we are 
trying to explain. The illusion is to leap from that repeated 
observation to the conclusion that consciousness is always that 
way; that the stream of contents continues without break when it 
does not." (Blackmore 2016)  
  
Here, using a metaphor, Blackmore wants to show that self-consciousness 
is an illusion. She takes "light" as consciousness and "darkness" as 
unconsciousness. According to Blackmore, we intuitively feel that there is 
always a flowing stream of colorful and concrete objects there, and we 
blive that it is a unified feature of the external world due to the fact that we 
only think (or overthink) about it whenever there is light, which makes us 
enable to have this visual experience; and we entirely ignore another 
important question: that is, "what is the darkness like?" she says that we 
have to train our introspection (probably through meditation) to look more 
carefully on the dark side. Then, she claims, without proposing any 
argument, that if we do that, we will find that nothing is there in the 
external world, and all the content of our conscious visual experience is an 
illusion. She holds that the true belief is what we have in darkness; we have 
to think of consists of darkness. She holds that the existence of 
consciousness is so compelling, attractive, intuitive only like the existence 
of concert objects during a day, which is full of light; however, both 
consciousness and those visible objections in the external worlds are 
illusions and cause the wrong realist believes on the conscious and external 






It might be said that rejecting of "Consciousness" experience isn't the same 
as being "Unconscious." She rejects the dichotomy between them, while 





The dichotomy in her language is a disjunction (and not a   conjunction); 
otherwise, she has to believe in a mental state, which is both conscious and 
unconscious at the same time. It seems that she is not going to accept such 
a weird contradictory idea.   
  
Yes, it is true that she seemingly rejects the dichotomy between conscious 
and unconscious states in her words; however, it is not the only thing that 
she has done in this paper. She arguably rejects the reality of one disjunct 
(that is, consciousness) as well. Actually, after rejecting the dichotomy, 
she argues that all the "mental states," which calls for an explanation 
should be considered as unconscious. That is, she first rejects the 
dichotomy, and secondly, rejects one disjunct (I know that such an 
approach might be pretty implausible; however, it seems that is what is 
done in this paper).  She actually rejects one disjunct (i.e., consciousness) 
of the dichotomy, and it, logically, means that she will support the other 
disjunct (i.e., unconsciousness). She explicitly and specifically states her 
opinion on being "unconscious" in her paper. She says:  
  
"While everything else remains 'unconscious.'"   
  
And in another part, she rejects the reality of one disjunct, i.e., 
consciousness:  
  
"I conclude that there is no intrinsic difference between conscious 
and unconscious processes, nor between conscious and 
unconscious actions or perceptions. Rather, consciousness   is a 
fleeting attribution that we make if and when we ask about it, either 
when asking such questions as 'What am I conscious of now?' or in 
retrospect when we think about the past." 
  
  
1.3. My response to Blackmore's illusionary self 
 
Blackmore's arguments on the illusionary self remind me of Hume's 
argument about constructed illusory "I" base on human memories and 
impressions. Blackmore's Humean explanation against realism on 
consciousness (in support of the delusion of self-consciousness) is not 
decisive; her explanation can be formulated as an opposite explanation, 
such that functions against illusionism, and would support what I call 
delusion of un-consciousness – that is, the illusion of being unconscious on 




Notice that by Unconsciousness, I intend the idea that all things (specifically 
human beings) are concrete objective natural physical entities, which lack 





"I suggest that consciousness appears as a stream only when we 
reflect on it as such. The rest of the time, multiple parallel processes 
carry on, …. When we ask 'What am I conscious of now?' or 'What 
is it like being me now?' some are gathered together, and the answer 
appears stream-like. There are memories of recent perceptions and 
thoughts and, if we remain mindful for a few moments, a changing 
array of new perceptions and thoughts coming along. There is a 
powerful sense of someone who is experiencing this stream. The 
illusion is to believe there is also a stream like this when we are not 
inquiring (Blackmore 2002, 2016)" 
 
I have a question for Blackmore. What is the response when we ask, 'Am I 
unconscious on some occasions?' High probably she will answer "Yes" 
(otherwise, it is against some premise she used in his argument, which says 
we are not always experiencing "consciousness" ). If so, I can explain way 
her being "unconscious" is a constructed illusory one, as follows: 
  
"I suggest that [un]consciousness appears as a stream only when we reflect 
on it as such. The rest of the time, multiple parallel processes carry on, …. 
When we ask [Am I unconscious on some occasions?] or 'What is it like 
[not]being me now?' some are gathered together, and the answer appears 
stream-like. There are memories of [lack of] perceptions and thoughts and, 
if we remain mindful [of] a few moments [in which we were not mindful], 
a changing array of [lack of] perceptions and thoughts coming along. There 
is a powerful sense of someone who is experiencing this stream [i.e., being 
unconscious on some occasions]. The illusion [of being unconscious on 
some occasions] is to believe there is also a stream like this [i.e., being 
unconscious] when we are [] inquiring (Blackmore 2002, 2016) 
 
By quoting her arguments and changing it using []s I wanted to show that 
the same argument seems to work against being unconscious or non-I. If it 
works well, it shows that her explanation doesn't support believing in the 
"delusion of consciousness" against believing in the "delusion of un-
consciousness"(i.e., a delusion that says all things are concrete objective 
natural unconscious physical facts.). 
 
The idea of "unconsciousness" and its continuity can be as illusionary and 
fabricated as the idea of "consciousness," based on Blackmore's 
explanation. However, in what follows, I will present a new intuitive (and 
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not counter-intuitive like Blackmore's) explanation, based on the concept of 
"forgetfulness" to show that the former is true; that is, the idea of 
unconsciousness and its continuity is an illusion. 
 
 
2. Delusion of Un-consciousness: Forgetfulness of Consciousness 
 
Consider Blackmore's questions again:  
  
2- 'Am I conscious now?'  
3- 'What is it like when I am not asking what is it like?" 
 
She says that 2 "makes us briefly conscious in a new way." And it causes 
an illusory continuous experience, which we call self-consciousness; then 
she says that we have to focus more on 3, and then we will find that 
unconsciousness is the real state of affairs. (and she didn't argue for this 
claim unless we count explanation away as a kind of argument). In the 
following experiment, I will focus on similar questions. 
 
2.1.Experiment 
Let's consider two similar questions: 
 
4- Are you self-conscious now? 





6- Please explain in some words the difference between your feelings 
on/understanding of self-consciousness, which is referred to in questions 4 
and 5 (or in your responses to 4 and 5)? 
 
I asked these questions from ten participants, and you will see their 









Response to 6 
1 Yes Yes SC in 4 is more clear and 
exact. It was vague in 5. 
2 Yes No I noticed SC when you asked 
me 4. I was heedless in 5. 
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3 Yes I don't know I noticed the border of my SC 
when you asked me in 4. 
4 Yes Yes I am always conscious 
without any difference 
between 4 and 5. 
5 Yes It is a 
difficult 
question. 
SC was neglected in 5. I was 
distracted by other things. 
Now I am more aware of it. 
6 Yes Yes, a little 
bit 
I was not aware of SC a 
minute ago; however, when 
you asked me 4, I became 
aware of it. 
7 Yes Yes I was SC at 5; however, I was 
not aware of SC then.  
8 Yes Yes, but it 
was not as 
strong as 
now. 
My mind was distracted a 
minute ago (5); I was less 
aware of it then. 
9 Yes Yes, but not 
that much 
I didn't think about it minutes 
ago (5).  
10 Yes Yes I was not paying attention to 
it a minute ago (5). It was 




2.2. Data Analysis 
 
All 10 participants said "Yes" to question 4, and it is not surprising. All of 
them feel that they are conscious when I asked them "are you self-conscious  
now?" 
 
7 out of 10 participants said "Yes" to question 5. They hold that they, 
strongly or weakly, were elf-conscious a few minutes ago. 2 participants 
said that they don't know the exact response. It was not clear for them. And 
one person said, "No." So, most of the participants believe that they were 
self-conscious a few minutes ago; however, they disagreed on the quality or 
features of these two states of "consciousness" at 4 and 5. It might be said 
that even that person who said "No," still wanted to refer to the significant 
difference between two states in 4 and 5; that is, she wanted to deny the 
similarity between the clear state in 4 (which we call consciousness) and 
what she felt in 5. Accordingly, almost all the participants believe that there 
is some kind of difference between these two states and concepts of 
consciousness in 4 and 5. 
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In question 6, I asked about the differences, and there are very interesting 
words in their responses. Their descriptive opinions about the two sates are 
as follows: 
  
Consciousness in 4:  more clear, more exact, just became aware of it, more 
aware of it now. 
  
Consciousness in 5: neglected, not aware of it, distraction, it was not thought 
then, it was forgotten, less aware, unaware, heedless, vagueness 
 
 
(Notice: The most interesting, and maybe helpful, response proposed by 
participant 7. She says:" I was SC at 5; however, I was not aware of SC 
then." According to her report, there are some situations,e.g., a minute ago, 
in which we are self-conscious; however, we are not (fully) aware of our 
being self-conscious.) 
 
Question 5 (in my experiment) is pretty similar to questions 3 (which is 
proposed by Blackmore.) However, Blackmore didn't respond to that 
question. Rather, she wanted to cast doubt on the intuitive response of 
people to question 2 on the existence of consciousness. In my experiment, 
I tried to get some real responses from 10 participants for question 5. As 
you see, they used some semantically similar words, e.g., "neglected," 
"distracted," "forgetfulness," "heedless," "don't remember," etc., in their 
responses to question 5.  
 
I take "forgetfulness" as a representative word here for the participant's 
response and define it by referring to "neglected," "distracted," "heedless," 
and "don't remember," etc., That is, by "forgetfulness," I refer to a state of 
mind in which a human agent is not (fully) aware of something, which is 
neglected, or he/she is heedless about it or his/her mind is distracted by 
some other thing (in multi-tasks situations (.  
 
This data enables us to explain away the un-consciousness delusion, not in 
a counter-intuitive approach, but in the intuitive and commonsensical terms 
of "forgetfulness." That is, whenever I say, "I was unconscious a moment 
ago," I am saying that "I had forgotten myself a moment ago [but not now]." 
Or "I was not fully aware of myself a minutes ago" or "it was neglected a 
minutes ago" or "I was distracted of my self a minutes ago," etc. Our mind 
is such that can not focus equally on many things at the same time; thus 
whenever we have focused on something (e.g., other things), we have 
forgotten some other thing (here, ourselves) to some extent. 
 
Therefore, the idea of unconsciousness is an illusion, which comes from a 
fabricated continue of some occasions in which we are less aware of our 
selves, or our self-conscious is pretty neglected in those occasions because 
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our mind is distracted by other things or we are more aware of others than 
ourselves. (The illusion is that) then, we generalized this state of neglect, 
forgetfulness, heedlessness to all the occasions and coined the term 
"unconsciousness;" while, whenever we are fully aware of ourselves and 
our minds are not distracted by other things; we strongly and intuitively feel 
that we are conscious agents, and it is the most significant difference 




It might be said that using data analysis is not helpful in response to 
Blackmore because she believes that we all are deluded, and it is the case 





I would say two things:   
 
First, commonsense mattes and intuition play a central role in analytic 
philosophy. (See Moore, 1925) Referring to the data helps us to learn more 
about the commonsensical meaning of the concepts and enables us to have 
a stronger intuition on the problem, whether or not Blackmore likes it. 
 
If Blackmore, or any other philosopher, is going to put the commonsense 
and intuition aside and defend something which is strongly counter-
intuitive, it would be okay; the only point is that they have to clarify their 
source of epistemic justification in knowledge formation. What are the 
sources and criteria of their knowledge about some concepts like 
"conciseness" or "unconciseness"?  
Notice that, when we, i.e.,  the analytic philosophers talk about 
"commonsense" or "intuition," it doesn't mean that these sources, which 
have been broadly used in analytic philosophy, are against scientific 
methods or empirical inquiries. It might be pretty the same or compatible 
with the scientific and empirical outcomes. That is, we have a variety of 
commonsensical and intuitional meanings relevant to different contexts. 
The scientific intuition between scientists is only one of them, while, 
Philohocal intuition is prevalent between philosophers, and so on so forth. 
However, there is a meaningful connection between different contextual 
intuitional and commonsensical knowledge. Some scholars tried to show 
that variation in intuitions in different contexts would undermine the 
validity of intuition (Swain 2008, Weinberg 2001); however, as Sosa (2007) 
says: 
 
"Well, maybe, to some extent. But surely, the effects of priming, 
framing, and other such contextual factors will affect the epistemic 
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status of intuition in general, only in the sort of way that they affect 
the epistemic status of perceptual observation in general. One would 
think that the ways of preserving the epistemic importance of 
perception in the face of such effects on perceptual judgments would 
be analogously available for the preservation of the epistemic 
importance of intuition in the face of such effects on intuitive 
judgments. The upshot is that we have to be careful in how we use 
intuition, not that intuition is useless. It is, of course, helpful to be 
shown how intuition can go astray in unfavorable conditions, just as 
perception can go similarly astray." 
 
 
Intuition matters, and If someone, like Blackmore, wants to defend an idea 
which is pretty against a majority of intuitional and commonsensical 
knowledge in a majority of contexts, then it is not plausible to still claim 
that the justification source of her/his theory comes from commonsense; and 
she didn't do that.  
 
That being said, she owes us a response to the following question: What are 
the sources and criteria of their knowledge about some concepts like 
"conciseness" or "unconsciousness"?  
 
Imagine that she says, "my response is the empirical methodology and 
science like what goes in neuroscience." If so, I would say that empirical 
science works well in supporting some empirical theories like physiological 
or biological theirs; however, it is clearly fallacious to use an empirical 
method to responses a metaphysical or epistemological question. I believe 
that all the famous response to the Positivism movement and their 
verification principle will work here again Blackmore (Given that she 
respond like this "my response is an empirical science")  
 
Moreover, even in the empirical fields, I believe that science usually can 
support the positive claims about the existence of some physical entities, 
and not vice versa (i..e, negative claims). Imagine that consciousness is a 
pretty physical feature. If so, using empirical methods, we can show that 
there are such things as consciousness in the actual physical world; 
however, it is much more difficult (if possible) to prove some probable 
physical tings doenst exits in the actual world because it calls for a complete 
inductive inquiry about all the things which exits in the word. Seemingly, 
we can claim that X doenst in the world, only if we can inductively explore 
its existence between all the existence and things in the world, and then if 
we could find it, we might be justified to inductively claims that X doesn't 
exist in the world. However, it is not still known. Becue maybe X does exist 
in t1 when we were exploring it in the world, but it might come to exist in 
t2. Therefore, it seems that it is almost impossible for empirical scientists to 
claim some negative propositions on the existence of some physical entities.  
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Secondly, I would say, in response to this objection, that Blackmore herself 
used data in her paper when she says: 
 
"Ask yourself this question: 'Am I conscious now?' I guess that your answer 
is 'yes.' " 
 
If data is not helpful and is not a reliable source for knowledge, then it would 
not be reliable for her argument as well. 
 
3. Another objection: from self-illusion to the illusion of consciousness 
 
Blackmore argues that the idea of self-consciousness is an illusion, and then 
she wrongly concludes that it shows the delusion of consciousness per se; 




"A temporary unity of a set of thoughts and perceptions is 
constructed and is linked to a representation of self as a continuing 
observer (Metzinger 2009). This we call the contents of our 
consciousness while everything else is called 'unconscious'….. I 
conclude that .. consciousness is a fleeting attribution that we make 
…" 
 
And also says : 
 




Blackmore begins with arguing against self and shows that it is nothing than 
an illusion; then, she concludes that consciousness is an illusion as well. 
She, high probability, right in the idea that "self" in "self-consciousness" is 
illusory; however, it doesn't necessarily entail the "delusion of 
consciousness." In the last sentence of her paper, she correctly denies the 
"duality of self and other"; however, she wrongly concludes that it shows 
"delusion of consciousness."  
 
She doesn't elaborate on an argument for this transition from self-illusion to 
the illusion of consciousness, and it seems that it is a pretty false idea. 
"consciousness" is not necessarily dependent on the limited illusory self. I 
am inclined to the idea that self is constructed, and I believe that Blackmore 
is right in that; I believe that after deconstructing the illusory "self", we will 
figure out some interesting things. However, it might come up with 
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something like an "absolute consciousness1" or "conscious about others," 
etc. If so, it leads us to two plausible ideas at the same time: "illusion of 




In this paper, I showed that Blackmore's explanation away against realism 
on consciousness is not decisive; I have formulated the same explanation 
against illusionism. I also proposed the alternative idea of "delusion of 
unconsciousness" and tried to explain the illusionary unconsciousness away 
based on the concept of forgetfulness; I have supported this alternative idea 
using some experimental data. Moreover, I shoed that Blackmore wrongly 
transmits from self-illusion to the illusion of consciousness. Even if we 
assume the idea of self-illusion (as it seems to be true), it doesn't logically 
leads us to the idea of illusion consciousness. There might be some more 







1 . I wish to elaborate more on the idea of "absolute consciousness"; 
however, I am not equipped well with the required appropriate concepts to 
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